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Genetic Enhancement and the 





As Diane Paul has noted, the term ‘eugenics’ (which was initially coined 
by the British scientist Francis Galton in 1883) draws on the Greek word 
eugenes (“good in birth”).1  The Greek patrimony of the term is appropriate, 
given that one of the most (in)famous eugenics programs in the history of 
Western thought is outlined in Book Five of Plato’s Republic, where Socrates 
proposes that the philosopher-kings arrange, through an elaborate scheme 
which relies heavily on deception and intrigue, for selected partners to mate 
with one another in order to produce individuals who are fit to govern in 
Kallipolis.2  Galton himself characterized eugenics as “the science of 
improving stock” which would deal with the question of how to facilitate 
“judicious mating” (Galton’s phrase), and it proposed to “[take] cognizance 
of all influences that tend in however remote degree to give the more 
suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over 
the less suitable than they otherwise would have.”3  
The sordid history of eugenics, and more specifically of its political uses 
and abuses, during the twentieth century is too well known to necessitate a 
recapitulation in the present essay.4  Suffice it to say that eugenics 
movements had a decidedly authoritarian—and even genocidal—bent, as 
evidenced most clearly by Nazi attempts to ‘regenerate’ an Aryan race 
which had supposedly fallen into decline through a program of, on the one 
hand, exterminating hereditary ‘undesirables’, while at the same time 
offering reproductive incentives to ‘pure-blooded’ Germans.5    
After the Second World War, the eugenics movement fell into disrepute 
(for obvious reasons). In recent years, however, there has been a renewed 
interest in the possibility of using genetic engineering to (again using 
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Galton’s phrase) “improve human stock”.   Defenders of genetic engineering 
have argued that we could modify an individual’s genetic composition in 
order to eliminate crippling diseases such as Tay-Sachs, while its most 
ardent defenders have endorsed the even stronger position that we could 
use technologies of genetic enhancement in order to improve an individual’s 
capacity for achievement within targeted areas (such as memory, 
intelligence, etc.).  Indeed, the advocates of genetic enhancement have 
promoted the return of eugenics in a new, market-oriented context (often 
referred to as “liberal eugenics”) that would operationalize the right of 
parents to select hereditary traits for their children which they regarded as 
desirable; in short, it would replace the discredited authoritarian paradigm 
with a neoliberal approach to genetic selection, allowing parents to create so-
called ‘designer babies’ which conform to their consumer preferences. 
While commentators across the political spectrum (from Habermas on 
the left to Fukuyama on the right), however, have offered criticisms of the at 
times euphoric celebration of the emancipatory possibilities afforded to 
humanity by genetic engineering,6 one potential concern has largely fallen 
by the wayside.  Numerous authors have discussed the threats posed to 
democracy by the use of genetic engineering (i.e. given that the wealthy 
could presumably access the new technology more readily than the poor, its 
use threatens to exacerbate already significant inequalities), but only Lee 
Silver and Francis Fukuyama (at least to my knowledge) have examined the 
possibility that we might confront the expansion of what I’ll call, following 
Michel Foucault and Enzo Traverso, “class racism” (which for the purposes 
of the present essay I simply understand as discriminatory attitudes or 
practices that are grounded in the biologization of socioeconomic 
differences).7  In the following essay I would like to explore this question in 
greater detail.  I will argue that liberal eugenics, which is supposed to 
promote individual freedom by giving parents the right to select hereditary 
dispositions for their children, in actuality threatens to undermine, in 
important ways, the foundations of an egalitarian liberal order by promoting 
the growth of class racism.  The essay is divided into four parts.  In the next 
section (II), I will describe liberal eugenics in greater detail.  In section three, 
I will provide a brief overview of Foucault’s discussion of class racism, in 
order to provide the context for section four, in which I examine how class 
racism might emerge from the expanded use of genetic engineering.  I will 
examine the dystopian implications of such a scenario, and in section five I 
will conclude with a series of reflections on how, precisely, opponents of 
liberal eugenics should think about it at the political level, and what, if 
anything, they can do to oppose it.  It’s important to add one final note 
before proceeding to the main discussion:  from a moral standpoint, there 
are compelling reasons to oppose genetic engineering for purposes of 
human enhancement, which I’m unable to present here in any detail.  Suffice 
it to say that there are immense risks associated with germline engineering, 
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and there are serious questions about the threats it poses to a future agent’s 
autonomy.  In the present essay, however, I’m more interested in the 
political dynamics of genetic enhancement, with a particular focus on the 
question of how its use could lead to the expansion of class racism and, 
given that risk, how we should think about it in political terms.   
 
II. What is Liberal Eugenics? 
In an article which initially appeared in 1998, Nicholas Agar introduced 
the idea of “liberal eugenics”.8  He eventually expanded the article into a 
book, defining the term with greater specificity.9  In both the original essay, 
as well as the more fully developed account contained in his book-length 
study, Agar contrasts liberal eugenics with its authoritarian predecessors.  
The proponents of authoritarian eugenics proposed to use the state (and all 
of its coercive power) in order to carry out eugenic policies, with the 
ultimate goal of building a new social order which corresponded to a 
particular conception of the good.  In the case of Plato, for example, eugenics 
is a means to producing individuals who are capable of ruling Socrates’ 
ideal regime in the most judicious fashion.  There is a clear conception of 
how the good society is ordered, and Socrates contends that eugenics is a 
powerful instrument for bringing such a society into existence.   
The defenders of liberal eugenics, on the other hand, emphasize the fact 
of pluralism in modern liberal societies, and insist that the state shouldn’t 
use its power in order to enforce eugenic policies; “[r]ather, it [liberal 
eugenics] would foster the development of a wide range of technologies of 
enhancement [and] parents’ particular conceptions of the good life would 
guide them in their selection of enhancements for their children.”10 In other 
words, liberal eugenics recognizes that in contemporary 
industrial/postindustrial societies which are characterized by high degrees 
of religious and cultural diversity,11 it’s problematic for the state to endorse 
a particular conception of the good, and it’s even more problematic to 
believe that the state is justified in using coercive forms of genetic 
engineering in order to promote a specific vision of the good life.  Liberal 
eugenics begins, then, from the premise that pluralism concerning the idea 
of the good is an inexorable feature of modern societies, and defends the 
(presumptive) right of parents to make genetic choices with minimal state 
interference based on their particular conception(s) of the good (although 
Agar stipulates that there are qualified limits; he believes, for example, that 
parents should not opt for genetic modifications which would substantially 
compromise the child’s future ability to make autonomous decisions when 
s/he reaches maturity12).   
On Agar’s description, therefore, liberal eugenics isn’t susceptible to the 
standard criticisms which are raised against using genetic engineering to 
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improve human beings (i.e. the dangers of state-sponsored eugenics, threats 
to individual liberty, etc.); indeed, to the extent that it proposes the 
enshrinement, and even expansion, of parents’ reproductive freedoms, it 
represents a marked departure from the coercive version of eugenics that is 
most closely associated with the authoritarian projects of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, in which particular groups were discouraged, 
or even forbidden, by the state to reproduce.13  If anything, liberal eugenics 
would open up a space for reproductive choice in which parents are 
provided with a wider assortment of options; genetic engineering would 
open up new vistas of reproductive liberty for couples.    
Thus, Agar is able to establish a clear, and morally significant, 
difference between liberal eugenics and its authoritarian predecessors.  But 
he does so at a high justificatory price, given that the appeal to expanded 
reproductive freedoms generates a host of new questions and moral 
dilemmas.  As mentioned above, for example, one of the most perplexing 
issues that arises from an appeal to the importance of safeguarding the 
reproductive freedom of parents is that it risks violating the rights of a 
future person.  Assume, for example, that a set of parents would like their 
child to become a basketball superstar, and they engineer for height.  If the 
child decides that s/he would like to become a world-class horse jockey, 
s/he has been placed at a significant disadvantage.  This is precisely why 
Agar establishes limits on the parents’ reproductive liberty; it threatens to 
undermine the autonomy of another moral agent.  
Yet if there are moral dilemmas that arise from Agar’s attempt to 
rehabilitate the image of eugenics by appealing to our moral intuitions 
concerning the value of reproductive freedom, there are also significant 
political questions which emerge from his analysis (although at the limit, it’s 
not easy to separate out moral from political concerns, especially in the case 
of questions surrounding the defensibility of genetic engineering).   On the 
assumption that technologies of genetic engineering would initially prove 
costly, one of the most prominent concerns which features in the secondary 
literature is the issue of whether, or to what extent, the widespread use of 
genetic engineering by the wealthy could exacerbate already existing 
inequalities between the rich and poor.  Indeed, in celebrating the expansion 
of consumer freedoms which neoliberals regard as one of the virtues of 
market-oriented genetic engineering, there is a tendency to minimize the 
challenges which genetic enhancement poses from the standpoint of social 
justice.    
While the political dangers of heightened inequality are fairly obvious, 
however, there is one potential threat which most commentators have 
ignored altogether.  If we concede that the wealthy would have a monopoly 
on technologies of genetic enhancement (at least from the standpoint of 
access)—a point which seems difficult to contest, given our market-oriented 
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approach to administering health-care14—then not only would we have to 
deal with the implications of the widening social gap for liberal democracies 
(which would include, obviously, an exacerbation of the already significant 
deficit which the poor confront in terms of their ability to influence political 
processes, as well as increased cynicism about the supposedly meritocratic 
distribution of positions in the social order), but we could also confront the 
spread of what I’ll call class racism.  In the next section, therefore, I will give 
an account of Foucault’s discussion of class racism in Society Must Be 
Defended, which will provide an overview of class racism’s past before we 
turn to an examination of its (potential) future.   
 
III. A Genealogy of Class Racism 
As mentioned in the introduction, I define class racism as 
discriminatory attitudes or practices which are grounded in the 
biologization of socioeconomic differences.15   In this section I’d like to 
provide a brief overview of the historical emergence and deployment of 
class racism through a reconstruction of Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended, 
which offers a genealogical examination of how the discourse of race war 
was taken up in different historical contexts by competing classes (who in 
turn deployed the language of race in order to mobilize support against their 
enemies).   
Foucault claims that, beginning in the Middle Ages, coercive power was 
monopolized by the State.  As a result, “private conflicts” started to 
disappear; relations of force developed at the frontiers of the State with other 
nations, but the social body itself was pacified and judicial order replaced 
the chaos of warfare.16  Eventually, in early modernity, a professionalized 
military apparatus emerged, and the army was transformed into a 
governmental institution.  As war was expelled from the private sphere, 
however, or centralized under State control, a new historico-political 
discourse emerged which regarded war as “the ineradicable basis of all 
relations and institutions of power”17 and was explicitly opposed to 
“philosophico-juridical” rationalities18.  Its origins date to the period 
immediately after the religious and civil conflicts of sixteenth century 
Europe (although it re-emerged in later epochs)19, and Foucault 
characterizes the discourse as a polemical attack on the rhetoric and 
institutions of sovereignty.  Rather than glorifying monarchy it posited that 
the king had used war, cruelty and bloodshed in order to subjugate his 
enemies, and it focused on the conflict which continued to rage beneath the 
veneer of pacification and legal order.   
Foucault argues that the new discourse was highly mobile, and it was 
taken up by both aristocrats and populists; the common point of attack, 
however, was royal power.20 It emerged in the seventeenth century, and it 
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had, in effect, two births.  First, it arose in the 1630’s during the 
postrevolutionary period of English history, where it was associated with 
the populist/petit-bourgeois discourse of the Puritans and Levellers.  We 
encounter its birth a second time at the end of Louis XIV’s reign 
(approximaely fifty years later) in the context of Boulainviller’s aristocratic 
critique of monarchical excess.21 Even at the earliest stages of its formation, 
however, the new discourse was organized around principles of race war; 
beneath the appearance of order and unity, differences of ethnicity, language 
and civilization divided the social body into warring camps. As Foucault 
writes, “it forms the matrix for all the forms beneath which we can find the 
face and mechanism of social warfare.”22  
Eventually, the discourse of race war underwent two important 
transcriptions.  First, there was a biologistic transcription which drew on the 
concepts and vocabulary of what Foucault calls a “materialist anatomo-
physiology”; it appeared both in hyper-nationalistic movements, as well as 
in  nationalistic struggles against the State apparatus, eventually surfacing in 
justifications of colonialism. A second transcription, which occurred in the 
early part of the nineteenth century, appropriated the discourse of race war 
but transformed it into the language of class struggle.23  The biological 
transcription eventually metastasized into a full-blown racism, with the idea 
that the polarity was now understood as a binary division within the race 
itself; in short, we see the emergence of a superrace and a subrace, where the 
struggle is increasingly played out between the dominant race and its 
degenerate other, an other which was initially subjugated but has now re-
emerged to torture the master race and destroy it.24  
As the new racialist discourse gradually seized power, however, it 
turned the force of the state against the “subrace”; it established a biological 
norm, the norm of the true race, against which the degenerate enemy was 
measured, with the correlative emergence of practices and institutions 
designed to safeguard the body of society through exclusion and 
segregation. In other words, the new racialist discourse abandoned the idea 
that society was divided between warring factions, exchanging it for the 
notion that the true race had to defend society against threats to its 
biological integrity.25  As Foucault writes, “[a]t this point, the racist thematic 
is no longer a moment of struggle against between one social group and 
another; it will promote the global strategy of social conservatives.”26  Thus, 
“we see the appearance of a State racism:  a racism that society will direct 
against itself, against its own elements and its own products.”27 
It is here, against the backdrop of an emergent State racism, that we 
encounter the more specific formation of class racism.  Balibar has noted that 
Disraeli viewed the state as split into “two nations”, and argues that 
Disraeli’s perspective was typical of the bourgeoisie’s response to 
progressive social movements.  It was necessary to split off the property-
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owning classes from industrial workers, who were in turn regarded as a 
quasi-biological menace to the social order.28  Traverso, following Sartre, 
notes that French literature in the period following the defeat of the 
Commune began to racialize, and call for the segregation of, the working-
class.29  In the second half of the nineteenth century, crowd psychologists 
such as Le Bon compared the urban proletariat to the so-called “inferior 
races”,30 a theme which was eventually taken up in the eugenicist work of 
Vacher de Lapouge, who contended that social inequalities were grounded 
in heredity.31   During roughly the same period (i.e. the last third of the 
nineteenth century) we encounter what Foucault calls “the urban reshaping 
of Paris” carried out by Haussmann, in which the city was effectively 
divided into rich and poor areas.  As Foucault writes, “[t]he feeling was that 
cohabitation between rich and poor in an undifferentiated environment 
constituted a health and political hazard for the city.”32  Foucault himself has 
shown how the eugenics movement of the nineteenth century contributed to 
the birth of Nazism in the twentieth,33 while Traverso speculates that there 
was a link between class racism and biologized anti-Semitism.34  Likewise, 
authors such as Edwin Black35 and Ladelle McWhorter36 have documented 
the prevalence of class racism in the American eugenics movements of the 
late nineteenth/twentieth centuries.   
 
IV. Liberal Eugenics and the Future of Class Racism 
At first glance, it seems implausible to believe that liberal eugenics, 
which defends the rights of parents to enhance their children and 
emphasizes the importance of defending their autonomy against state 
coercion, could have any relationship, however, tangential, to the historical 
discourses of class racism discussed in section three of this essay.  While it is 
true, however, that the normative framework used to justify liberal eugenics 
has no obvious connection to ideologies of race war, it is nevertheless the 
case that the practice of genetic engineering could have the unintended 
consequence of establishing the parameters for a class warfare which is 
increasingly defined in racialized terms.     Indeed, Lee Silver envisions a 
dystopian future in which society is divided into distinct sub-races; the 
‘Naturals’ have elected to forgo use of genetic enhancement, either for moral 
reasons or, more generally, because they lack financial resources,37 while the 
members of the second class, referred to as the ‘Gene-Enriched’ (or, the 
‘GenRich’, an elite group which comprises roughly ten percent of the 
American population), carry synthetic genes which have allowed them to 
excel in sports, science, politics and business.38  They constitute what Silver 
describes as a “modern-day hereditary class of genetic aristocrats.”39 Over 
time, the genetic advantages which members of GenRich enjoy vis-à-vis 
their unenhanced fellow citizens have grown so significant that they exercise 
a thoroughgoing control of the major institutions in society; their intellectual 
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capacities surpass that of so-called Naturals to such an extent that the latter 
are simply incapable of challenging the hegemony of their genetic 
“superiors”.   
How, exactly, would such as scenario play out in a political context?  
There are obviously a number of possibilities, but in Our Posthuman Future, 
Francis Fukuyama has speculated that it could lead to the explosion of class 
racism and the subversion of foundational egalitarian assumptions which 
are essential to the (relative) stability of liberal democracies.40  Indeed, at the 
limit he claims that “[i]f wealthy  parents suddenly have open to them the 
opportunity to increase the intelligence of their children as well as that of all 
their subsequent descendents, then we have the makings not just of a moral 
dilemma but of a full-scale class war.”41  He imagines a society divided 
along class lines, but it is a form of class division with a perversely 
biopolitical twist in which “[y]ou can increasingly tell the social background 
of a young person by his or her looks and intelligence; if someone doesn’t 
live up to social expectations, he blames bad genetic choices by his parents 
rather than himself.”42  Thus, while it’s certainly true that contemporary 
societies are already characterized by high levels of class stratification, with 
all of the attendant problems which ordinarily accompany sharp 
demarcations in social status, and while it’s furthermore the case that 
individuals are often subject to prejudicial judgment/treatment, 
stereoytping, etc. based on their appearance or intellect, under Fukuyama’s 
scenario such judgments would increasingly reflect the belief that class 
differences are the result of biological factors, and individuals who were 
either unable or unwilling to use the new technologies of genetic 
modification would constitute a new “subrace” of hereditary inferiors.       
Indeed, both Fukuyama and Michael Sandel have pointed out that, in 
our present society, we tend to believe that at least part of our success is the 
result of accident and luck.43  This leads, in turn, to a recognition of the 
contingency of our circumstances, which (hopefully) creates a sense of 
solidarity with others.  As Sandel writes, “the more alive we are to the 
chanced nature of our lot, the more reason we have to share our fate with 
others.”44  But if the engineered elites begin to feel that their achievements 
are the result of their parent’s genetic choices, they may begin to believe that 
they deserve whatever rewards they enjoy.  Fukuyama speculates that 
“[t]hey may, in short, feel themselves to be aristocrats, and unlike aristocrats 
of old, their claim to better birth will be rooted in nature and not 
convention.”45  
Here it’s important to add a clarifying remark in order to ward off one 
possible objection to the scenario outlined above.  In the absence of further 
argumentation, one could possibly infer that Fukuyama believes that it’s 
sufficient for the wealthy to enhance their children in order to produce the 
kinds of changes which would give their offspring a genetic advantage.  In 
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other words, one could infer that he presupposes the correctness of genetic 
determinism, which is the assumption that there is a (more or less) 
straightforward connection between a person’s genotype and the observable 
traits/character which a person develops (which are often referred to, in 
more technical terminology, as an individual’s phenotype).  But the 
phenotypical expressions of a person’s genetic composition are the result of 
complex interactions between genes and the environment; thus, it’s 
problematic to believe that simply because parents can engineer for, say, 
intelligence, it will follow with necessity that the child will develop superior 
intellectual abilities.  We don’t, however, need to endorse the fallacious 
assumptions of genetic determinists in order to show why Fukuyama is 
justified in worrying about the potential biologization of class differences.  If 
we add the reasonable assumption that the majority of wealthy parents are 
also able to provide their children with better education, nutrition, etc., in 
addition to giving them a genetic head-start, we can easily deflect the 
determinist objection.46   
In addition to the concerns mentioned above, another worry is that 
members of the new subclass would be labeled “genetically at risk”.47  As 
Nikolas Rose has noted, bioethicists are concerned that individuals who are 
labeled “genetically at risk” would have to navigate a complex set of 
discriminatory practices.  The most familiar concerns have to do with the 
denial of health insurance, or even employment, based on genetic 
information.48  A second, and less familiar, potential difficulty, however, is 
the use of genetic testing in educational contexts.  Rose highlights the 
existence of pilot programs which screen students for genetic abnormalities 
(such as duplicate X or Y chromosomes) with the goal of providing medical 
interventions.49  In addition, he emphasizes the concerns of authors such as 
Dorothy Nelkin and Laurence Tancredi that genetic screening could become 
a standard form of testing in schools, which would lead to discrimination 
against students with genetic irregularities and “a life sentence under the 
gaze of the therapeutic professionals.”50   
 
V. Opposing Liberal Eugenics 
Defenders of enhancement have responded in a variety of ways to the 
scenarios of heightened inequality sketched out in the previous section.  
Libertarians such as Simon Young, for example, have tended to dismiss the 
criticisms of liberals and the Left, arguing that as citizens of poorer nations 
become more wealthy they will have better access to genetic engineering.51  
Similarly, Ray Kurzweil notes that as a general rule, the price of new 
technologies is initially prohibitive for everyone except the wealthiest 
individuals, but eventually they become more affordable.52   
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There is, however, disturbing evidence to the contrary.  As Melinda 
Cooper notes, by the mid-nineties pharmaceutical corporations had 
developed  retroviral therapies which allowed patients in wealthy nations to 
manage the devastating effects of AIDS, yet millions of HIV-positive 
individuals in sub-Saharan Africa had no access to the new drugs due to 
their prohibitive costs.53   If that’s true in the case of genetic technologies as 
well, then there are good reasons to approach arguments such as Young’s 
with skepticism (to put it charitably).   
Thus, if we’re justified in being concerned about the potential 
implications of genetic enhancement, then what action, political or 
otherwise, could or should opponents of liberal eugenics take in order to 
prevent the emergence of a society which is split along increasingly 
racialized class lines?54  One strategy is to simply ban the use of genetic 
engineering altogether.  Yet even the most ardent opponents of human 
enhancement have recognized the potential value of using genetic 
engineering for therapeutic purposes.55   In any event, there are two serious 
difficulties with this approach.   First, bioethicists have presented well-
reasoned arguments in defense of the idea that there is a valid ethical 
distinction between the use of genetic modifications for purposes of therapy 
vs. their use for enhancement.56  Secondly, and more importantly from a 
practical vantage point, I believe that the public will view legal prohibitions 
on technologies which it regards as having the potential to benefit humans 
as irrational and counterproductive.  Thus, a second approach legislators 
could pursue is to allow genetic engineering for therapeutic purposes but 
prohibit its use for enhancements.  Ultimately, however, it’s hard to 
maintain the distinction, since in both cases one could argue that an agent’s 
capacity is enhanced (if only indirectly in the case of therapeutic 
interventions).57  If the general public also moves in the direction of 
questioning, and finally rejecting, the proposed distinction, then legislative 
pressure will eventually undermine the efficacy of the second approach. 
 A third approach, then, is to allow genetic engineering both for 
purposes of therapy as well as enhancement, with the government 
providing regulatory oversight and/or guaranteeing that the poor have 
access to the requisite technologies.  Indeed, various proponents of genetic 
enhancement have conceded that concerns about worsening social 
inequality are well-founded, and have speculated about how to distribute 
access to genetic engineering more fairly, or at least mitigate the impact of its 
use by elites in society.  Maxwell Mehlman, for example, argues that the 
state could conduct a national ‘enhancement lottery’, in which every citizen 
was entered, and individuals would have the right to decline their winnings 
if they had moral, political or other objections to genetic engineering.58  
Nicholas Agar defends a Rawslian-style approach in which “[g]oods of 
genetic engineering must be allocated to an individual in a way that 
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improves the prospects associated with all possible life plans—most 
especially the worst off potential life plan.”59 James Hughes has argued that 
the state has an obligation to provide medical care for all its citizens, and 
that it should offer financial support for enhancements when fiscally 
possible.60 Peter Singer, meanwhile, advances a more radical proposal, 
suggesting that we could subsidize enhancements for the poor while 
limiting the access of affluent individuals,61 (although he has concerns about 
this approach, since he believes that a general right to enhancement will 
ultimately benefit society to the greatest extent possible62).   
While I’d like to reiterate that there are compelling moral and political 
reasons to oppose the use of genetic engineering for purposes of human 
enhancement, my analysis in this section has hopefully shown why I’m 
pessimistic about the chances of enacting effective regulatory controls on its 
use.  If that’s the case, and if it’s furthermore true that we’re concerned about 
the worsening of social inequality (and at the limit the dissemination of class 
racism with all of its attendant problems), how should opponents of genetic 
enhancement conceptualize the future political landscape?   Which, if any, of 
the measures recommended in the preceding paragraph should they 
embrace?  While I realize that the responses I’m about to provide are bound 
to appear evasive, I nevertheless think that the first question is logically 
prior to the second, and necessitates caution in giving any answer, however, 
provisional, to the question of which concrete policy proposals we should 
endorse.     
In thinking about how we should view the political terrain of the future, 
Foucault’s work on biopolitics is indispensable, and this is especially true in 
the case of the coming battles over the moral legitimacy of genetic 
engineering.  There is nothing particularly surprising or original about this 
observation.  It is, however, important to keep in mind as we approach the 
inescapable struggles over the future of the species.  As Agamben notes, 
“our private biological body has become indistinguishable from our body 
politic…But it is by starting from this uncertain terrain that today we must 
find the path of another politics, of another body, of another word.”63   We 
can either lament this fact and nostalgically pretend that it’s possible to 
restore the public/private distinction, or we can recognize that our bodies, 
and the body politic more broadly conceived, are sites of political 
contestation.  The mapping of the genome, and its attendant consequences, 
will only intensify the trajectories which Foucault had already identified in 
the seventies; the new question we’re confronted with, then, is how we can 
exercise democratic control over the biogenetic technologies which loom on 
our horizon.   
What this entails, more specifically, in the context of the debate 
surrounding genetic enhancement is that we can’t simply defer to the 
judgments of ‘experts’ concerning which forms of genetic engineering 
are/are not appropriate (especially ‘experts’ who are employed by corporate 
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entities which will profit handsomely from the coming genetic revolution); 
likewise, we can’t allow them to dictate which policies to adopt.  Indeed, the 
response from the Right has consisted of an appeal to the moral absolutism 
of natural law/theology.  This strategy is bound to fail, both theoretically 
(because it presupposes a dubious conception of human nature and fails to 
recognize the pluralism of modern societies) as well as practically (for the 
reasons I mentioned above, having to do with the public’s general belief that 
genetic engineering is morally defensible for therapeutic purposes).  Rather, 
it is important to mobilize democratically in order to assert control over the 
new technologies, with the goal of preventing the kind of two-tiered access I 
have discussed in previous sections.  
In providing this admittedly lengthy answer to the first question I 
posed, I hope it becomes clear why it’s difficult, if not impossible, to answer 
the second one.  If I’m correct that we should struggle to reassert control 
over our own bodies, and the body politic at a collective level, in a 
democratic fashion, then we can’t give a priori recommendations about 
which specific policies to adopt.    Rather, the primary task of the Left going 
forward is the collective articulation of how, precisely, we should think, and 
more importantly respond to, the reshaping of humanity in a progressive 
fashion.  Perhaps we can draw, at least in part, on the work of Hardt and 
Negri;64 however, by seeing the struggle over our biological future as a 
chance for the multitude of so-called biological ‘undesirables’—the weak, 
the poor, the disabled; in short, all the genetic ‘inferiors’ who are 
marginalized by the new biopolitical order—to affirm their power, or as the 
opening up of new spaces for political contestation which bring 
contradictions and antagonisms into sharper focus.  In this case, as in so 
many others, the politics of the future will consist of battles which are fought 
on the terrain of life itself.  
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